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Abstract: This paper attempts a synthesis of theoretical and empirical work on 
international financial contagion. Although a professional consensus on the appropriate 
definitions of contagion has yet to emerge, we document substantial research progress 
towards this goal. On the empirical front, determining when returns are ‘excessive’ is a   
pre-condition for designing effective policy response to crises. At the theoretical level, 
tracing the observed herding behavior to market participants’ uncertain beliefs and 
information asymmetries is a key element for understanding how contagious effects arise. 
It is argued that the recent focus on better understanding of high-frequency financial 
returns data and decision making at the market microstructure level are promising 
avenues for understanding the transmission of shocks across markets and countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Use of the word ‘contagion’ to describe the international transmission of financial crises 
has become fraught with controversy, to the extent that some recent authors have seen fit 
to avoid using the word entirely; see Favero and Giavazzi (2002) and Rigobon (2003). 
The term evokes an emotive response among both producers and consumers of research 
on international financial markets, and there is no general agreement over its use.1 
Emotional responses stem in part from the borrowing of epidemiological terminology – 
contagion is intrinsically associated with disease, and even more dismally with death, as 
contagion was often used as a synonym for the Bubonic Plague in Europe as late as the 
19th century. The term also implies, at least to some, that those who fall prey to financial 
crises do so through no fault of their own. However, this is an idea that some analysts are 
inclined to strongly resist: speculators appear to discriminate in choosing the countries 
they attack.  
Against this background, in this paper we suggest that the World Bank’s ‘restrictive’ 
definition of contagion is a useful benchmark.2 This follows Eichengreen and Rose 
(1995) and Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996), who propose that contagion refers to 
the association of excess returns in one country with excess returns in another country 
after controlling for the effects of fundamentals. This definition is closely related to ‘true’ 
contagion, as defined in Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), arising in the absence of, or after 
controlling for, common shocks and all possible interconnection channels.  
Even with agreement on this definition, there are formidable difficulties in reaching the 
appropriate set of fundamentals to use as control variables, suggesting that such models 
may not be effectively operational. On the counter side, recent empirical research 
proposes two alternative means. Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Martin (2003) 
propose the use of latent factor models, which do not require the exact specification of 
the fundamental relationships, while Pesaran and Pick (2003) suggest controlling for 
                                                 
1 For example, Pericoli and Sbracia (2001) provide an overview of the contagion literature containing five 
different classifications of contagion. 
2 The World Bank’s definitions of contagion are available on the Internet at 
http://www.1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/managing%20volatility/contagion/definitions.htm. 
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fundamental-based market interdependencies using trade flow data and examining 
contagion as transmissions above that. Each approach contains an implicit criticism of the 
other. The Dungey et al. framework suggests that the interdependencies captured in the 
data are insufficiently general, while Pesaran and Pick find that interdependencies are not 
sufficiently identified in the latent factor framework. Both methodologies have difficulty 
in identifying fundamental contagion from other transmissions – a problem highlighted 
by Dornbusch, Claessens and Park (2000).  
A variation on the above definition is whether contagion represents the unanticipated 
transmission of shocks. When cross-country linkages countries are anticipated – for 
instance through trade and financial flows or other a priori links - then these represent 
fundamental linkages, hence they are not contagion. Arguably, the particular channel 
through which contagion is transmitted is equally important, such as through financial 
markets, trade relations, political linkages and expectations. Researchers emphasizing the 
importance of identifying the channels argue that this is a way of reassuring observers 
that underlying the estimated correlations is really the international transmission of 
financial stress, and not simply variables which are common across countries but omitted 
from the specification.  
The choice of fundamentals is not independent of the problem at hand. The literature 
tends to adopt definitions of contagion specific to each application, and given the 
difficulties inherent in defining the appropriate control variables this may be appropriate. 
As a result, contagion may in fact be a concept that is defined relative to a particular set 
of fundamentals, so its appropriate definition is the co-movement of excess returns in one 
country with excess returns in another country after controlling for the effects of 
specified fundamentals. Contagion is then defined relative to the chosen fundamentals 
control group.3   
Thus, any test for the presence of contagion is only as good as the fundamentals-based 
model determining cross-country output correlations, excess market returns, etc. An early 
theoretical account of contagion between two countries linked by their current and 
                                                 
3 Thanks to David Vines for helpful discussions to clarify this point. 
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capitals accounts is Gerlach and Smets (1995). In empirical applications, researchers 
have used a number of alternative controls for representing fundamental variables. For 
example, Miller, Thampanishvong and Zhang (2003) use U.S. interest rates as a control 
variable, while Eichengreen, Wyplosz and Rose (1995,1996) employ an array of 
economic and political ‘focus variables’, including exchange rates and interest rates, CPI 
inflation, the current account and budget balances, stock market indices, and indicators of 
domestic credit and labor markets and political conditions; some of these are replicated in 
Pesaran and Pick (2003). In that respect, an advantage of latent factor models such as 
Dungey et al. (2003), Bekaert, Ng and Hodrick (2003) and Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia 
(2002) is that they do not require the particular observed fundamental relationships to be 
specified. The disadvantage is that the transmission channels for contagion are not 
specifically identified -- for example, is it through trade or financial flow issues. In other 
words, the mechanism by which the underlying fundamentals affect asset prices is not 
accounted for. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 discusses how the known 
statistical properties of financial market data are incorporated into models and tests for 
contagion. Section 3 examines empirical issues in testing for contagion and defining 
crisis sample periods. This is followed in Section 4 by a discussion of the potential for 
contagion in different dimensions. In addition, a market participant’s view on contagion 
may differ from that of a policy maker; this is discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 
considers the role of IMF intervention. Section 7 offers some concluding remarks. 
2. Capturing the Properties of Financial Market Data 
If financial contagion is associated with excess returns, then the problem of defining 
these is immediately raised. To know when returns are ‘excessive’ requires an effective 
model of asset prices during normal times.  At a minimum, the statistical properties of 
financial markets data need to be accommodated in any modeling exercise.4 Empirical 
                                                 
4 One set of stylized facts for contagion is the existence of strong regional effects in equity and currency 
market contagion, such as documented by Agenor, Miller, Vines and Weber (1999), Eichengreen (2002), 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002) and Krugman (2000). However, for bond market data this regionality does 
not seem to be present, a feature noted by Masson, Chakravarty and Gulden  (2003) and confirmed in 
Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Martin (2002) in a study of the Russian and LTCM crises. 
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distributions of daily financial market returns are typically non-normal and display 
volatility clustering (time-varying heteroscedasticity/GARCH effects) and fat tails 
(leptokurtosis). Thus, researchers proposing to model financial market processes should 
arguably be expected to reproduce these characteristics. The production of data 
distributions with fat tails requires some form of non-linearity, and introducing this 
constitutes an important strand of contagion research.  
Non-linear models incorporate both the statistical properties and the observation that the 
propagation mechanism for shocks may differ between normal and crisis periods. One 
class of models, such as Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) and Baur and Schulze (2002), 
examines relationships only in the tails of the distributions. In a variation on this, 
Quintos, Fan and Phillips (2001) view differences between non-turmoil and crisis periods 
as changes in the behaviour of the tails themselves. Others divide extreme observations 
from those in a ‘usual’ range using some form of threshold function between calm and 
crisis periods, such as is suggested by Pesaran and Pick (2003) and undertaken in earlier 
work in a linear model by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995,1996) and Favero and 
Giavazzi (2002). Pesaran and Pick separate contagion from interdependence by use of a 
model of transmissions in ‘normal’ times. Contagion is then represented non-linearly by 
the introduction of transmissions of relatively large shocks across countries, where the 
definition of a relatively large shock is determined by a threshold function.  
Another source of concern in the existing literature on contagion is that the strong 
heteroskedasticity present in financial returns data is not treated consistently. For 
example, the initial model of Miller et al. (2003) cannot generate crises because it has no 
means of producing heteroskedasticity unless a market maker is present. On the other 
hand, Favero and Giavazzi (2002) use heteroskedasticity and non-normality to identify 
crisis periods, and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) identify the existence of contagion through 
a change in volatility.  
This points to the importance of the definition of a crisis period in identifying contagion. 
A majority of researchers assume that contagion is a feature only of crisis data, and hence 
uses the presence of heteroskedasticity for identifying crises. Two broad methods of 
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crisis period identification are encountered in the literature. The first is ad hoc and 
usually event based (Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Dungey et al (2002)), while the second 
relies on identifying turbulence with higher volatility observations, based on thresholds 
determined from the sample (Favero and Giavazzi (2002), Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz (1995)). This method is subject to sample selection bias, to the extent that the 
volatility threshold is exogenous. Put differently, by raising the threshold level the analyst 
is selecting fewer ‘crisis observations’. Research progress on endogenizing the process of 
separating crisis from non-crisis data in the sample would be a substantial step forward.  
3.  Market Interdependence and Crisis Thresholds 
In order to isolate contagious effects, the relative strength of market interdependence and 
contagion need to be both modeled simultaneously and separately identified. 
Interdependence, as opposed to contagion, occurs if cross-market co-movement is not 
significantly bigger after a shock to one country, or group of countries.  Controlling for 
this is easier in a bivariate setting with two countries and two asset markets than in a 
multivariate environment, although the resulting dynamics are not as rich.  
There has been extensive evidence of rising correlation between international financial 
markets in recent decades, keeping pace with the trend towards capital account 
liberalization; see, for example, Longin and Solnik (1995). More recently, the bivariate 
test for significant changes in the conditional correlation between asset returns over non-
crisis and crisis periods was popularised by Forbes and Rigobon (2001, 2002). 
Applications include Baig and Goldfajn (1999) and Ellis and Lewis (2000).  This is the 
most common test in the literature; some of the relevant issues in running it are covered 
in Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2001), Loretan and English (2000) and Boyer, Gibson 
and Loretan (1999).  The correlation test is a variant of the World Bank’s ‘very 
restrictive’ definition of contagion, although in the majority of applications there is some 
attempt to control for (a limited set of) fundamentals.5 Although existing applications are 
bivariate, Dungey et al (2003) show the multivariate equivalent.  
                                                 
5 Butler and Joaquin (2002) conduct tests consistent with the ‘very restrictive’ definition of contagion, 
although their paper is not directly addressing this issue. 
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In the correlation testing approach, the issue of defining the crisis sample period again 
arises, because the sample is chosen to coincide with consensus dating of crises. Sample 
selection problems plague the empirical identification of contagion, underscored by the 
wide heterogeneity in the financial crises experience of different countries. Additionally, 
the sample size of crisis episodes is typically small, implying poor power properties. In 
many cases the thresholds used to identify crisis periods are not independent of the 
sample, for example Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995,1996), Favero and Giavazzi 
(2002). Preferably, the choice of threshold should be modeled simultaneously with the 
choice of crisis period, as shown by Pesaran and Pick (2003). Correct identification of the 
threshold between non-crisis and crisis periods has direct implications for financial crisis 
prevention and management; this is discussed in Section 5.    
Leading indicators of financial crises serve to avert policy makers to looming crises. 
They also present one means of identifying thresholds between non-crisis and crisis 
periods. This area of the literature combines fundamental indicators to provide a ‘crisis 
vulnerability’ index that could serve as an early warning system for public policy, as for 
example in Goldstein (1998) and Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000). The 
combination of fundamental variables with a threshold based on historical data is similar 
in intent to the approach used by Eichengreen, Wyplosz and Rose (1995,1996) to 
construct an exchange market pressure index.  
Unfortunately, very few fundamental indicators are found to be statistically significant 
control variables in existing applications. In the historical analysis of Eichengreen, Rose 
and Wyplosz (1995, 1996) and related studies this was not such a large problem. Perhaps 
more disturbingly, crisis indicators based on fundamental indicators have also proved to 
have poor predictive power in forecasting financial crises; see, for example, Edison 
(2000) and Berg and Patillo (1999). This is reflected in the heterogeneity of currency 
crises’ causes and features for different countries, documented in Frankel and Rose 
(1996), as well as in the unpredictability of reversals in short-term capital flows, 
emphasized by Calvo’s (1998) sudden stops.  Poor predictive power suggests that non-
linearity and breaks in the generating processes of financial market data are pervasive, as 
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discussed earlier. Susceptibility to contagion is highly non-linear, and historical 
relationships – however robust – are not useful in predicting future financial crises.  
 
More generally, models of financial contagion can be classified as fundamental or 
behavioural. In the first category the analysis is event-driven, where the event is usually a 
financial crisis. Examples include the applications of Glick and Rose (1999) and Van 
Rijikghem and Weder (2001) to shocks from a particular country identified as ‘country 
zero’. On the other hand, behavioural models consider that changing beliefs and ‘herding’ 
underlie the transmission of shocks between countries. A good example is the situation 
presented by Miller, Thampanishvong and Zhang (2003) investigating the turmoil in 
Brazilian financial markets in 2001. Although turmoil existed in Brazilian financial 
markets, the feared event of sovereign debt default did not materialize. Consequently, 
there was no identifiable crisis event – rather, the turmoil was caused by fear of the 
potential cost of default. A useful distinction between the biological and behavioural 
models is that biological models tend to operate in a time series domain, following an 
event, whereas fundamental models operate in both time series and cross-section 
dimensions.  This is the subject of the next Section. 
4. Herding, Contagion and Models with Multiple Equilibria 
The empirical contagion literature is frequently based on time series explorations. 
However, this may not be the appropriate dimension in all instances. For example, 
Masson, Chakravarty and Gulden (2003) suggest that contagion and herding by investors 
can be distinguished as they respectively belong to the time series and cross-section 
dimensions. However, although ‘true’ contagion – unanticipated transmission of shocks – 
is often associated with herding behavior, the latter need not be a necessary condition for 
contagion. Pesaran and Pick (2003) in particular suggest that herding and contagion can 
be separately identified, but modelled simultaneously. 
In theoretical models, contagion is commonly identified as an equilibrium phenomenon. 
On the one hand, if contagion is due to herding, this can be viewed as a rational response 
on the part of investors when there are fixed costs of acquiring and processing country-
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specific information, as in Calvo and Mendoza (2000). On the other hand, 
macroeconomic models with rational expectations generically have multiple solutions.  It 
follows that researchers’ different informational assumptions can have different 
implications regarding the number of equilibria. If a given set of fundamentals can give 
rise to multiple equilibria, then speculative attacks can be self-fulfilling and contagion 
can also be ‘irrational’, that is unanticipated. Within a cross-section, investors’ behavior 
can be interpreted as jumps between different equilibria. The issue of multiplicity is 
critical for some models of contagion – for example, see Shiller’s (2000) account of the 
U.S. stock market bubble in the late 1990s. The strength of the self-fulfilling mechanism 
for contagion may also be a potent explanatory factor underlying the collapse of the ERM 
in 1992-93; see Drazen and Masson (1994). 
The issue of unique versus multiple equilibria relates to the debate between fundamental-
based  (first-generation) and beliefs-based (second-generation) models of currency crisis. 
The first originated with Krugman (1979) while the second can be traced to Flood and 
Garber (1984) and is closely associated with Obstfeld (1994, 1996). In fundamental-
based models, the crisis occurs deterministically as foreign exchange reserves run out, but 
there is no contagion. Beliefs-based models can admit multiple equilibria and ‘sunspots’ 
leading to self-fulfilling beliefs and speculative attacks. In the context of currency crises, 
if market participants anticipate that a successful attack on a currency peg will alter 
exchange rate policy, it is expected future fundamentals conditional on an attack that are 
incompatible with the peg. In the time series domain, contagion to a country is then 
understood as jumps between multiple equilibria triggered by events elsewhere. 
However, there now appears to be a consensus that a unique equilibrium may be an 
artefact of the unrealistic treatment of expectations; see Jeanne and Masson (2000), 
Kehoe (1996) and Krugman (1996, 2000). One source of multiplicity is that expectations 
can also be formed at the time of the financial crisis, rather than fixed beforehand. 
Multiplicity is also sensitive to the policy maker having a short-term expansionary 
motive. In the context of emerging markets this can be rationalized by policy makers’ 
preference for fiscal seigniorage (Calvo and Reinhart (2002)); it is, however, by no 
means universally applicable. 
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With complete and symmetric information there can be self-fulfilling beliefs underlying 
the occurrence of financial crises. Along these lines, Jeanne and Masson (2000) and 
Masson (1999a,b,c) generate multiple equilibria in currency crises. In contrast, Allen and 
Gale (1998, 2000) focus on real, as opposed to financial, contagion acting through 
incomplete markets for interregional claims on liquidity, akin to cross-border deposit 
insurance. Their approach is characterized by complete information and is restricted to 
liquidity crises with no currency component, in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) and Diamond (1991).  In that framework, the mismatch of long-dated assets and 
short-dated liabilities generates rational, that is anticipated, contagion in any equilibrium 
of the model.  
The fact that the onset of contagion is rationally anticipated generates a role for the 
central bank as a lender of last resort whose mission is to complete markets.6 In that 
regard, the conventional view is that the benefits of more international capital market 
integration outweigh the costs (Rogoff (1999)). Recent work has questioned this by 
highlighting the adverse side effects of more interconnectedness. Kodres and Pritsker 
(2002) show that contagion can arise in rational equilibrium if investors engage in cross-
market hedging of their portfolios’ exposures to shared macroeconomic risk factors. The 
severity of contagion then depends on different markets’ sensitivities to the shared 
macroeconomic risks, as well as on the degree of information asymmetry in each market.  
As cross-market hedging normally requires moderate to high correlation between 
countries’ financial markets, the implication is that higher co-movement between asset 
returns makes contagion more likely; see also Kyle and Xiong (2001) and the discussion 
of Cohen and Shin (2003) below. 
In understanding the onset of financial crises and contagion, the informational structure 
underlying expectations formation is also important per se, that is over and above the 
timing issues discussed earlier. A key paper in this area is Morris and Shin (1998): these 
authors show the assumption that fundamentals are common knowledge is crucial for 
multiple equilibria to arise in self-fulfilling currency crisis models. If market players have 
higher orders of uncertainty about other players’ beliefs – i.e., everyone may know that 
                                                 
6 On lender of last resort issues see Gale and Vives (2002) and Goodhart and Illing (2003).  
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the fundamentals are sound, but not everyone may know that everyone knows this – then 
a unique equilibrium is obtained as a function of macroeconomic fundamentals and 
relevant financial state variables. This finding suggests the need for transparent policy 
and wide information dissemination to prevent crises. More generally, Allen, Morris and 
Shin (2003) show that market prices are biased towards the public information set. In 
turn, that set is the intersection of all market participants’ private information sets, hence 
the role for policy makers to create more common knowledge and bring observed prices 
closer to their true fundamentals-driven value.7    
5. Market Participants versus Policy Makers: Different Perspectives? 
A particular problem for identifying the process of herding in the data is the endogenous 
process of price discovery in the markets. In real time, price discovery impacts on the 
transmission of shocks, as in Farmer and Joshi (2002). To this end, a promising approach 
would be to examine crises using very high frequency data at an intra-day level. The 
importance of market microstructure issues is omitted from lower frequency applications. 
In that regard, Cohen and Shin’s (2003) VAR model of tick-by-tick U.S Treasury data 
finds that trades (order flow) and price changes may exhibit positive feedback in periods 
of market stress. This highlights the possibility of spillover effects and contagion 
occurring at the microstructure level during market turbulence. Moreover, such contagion 
is entirely consistent with sophisticated traders’ rational decision making in the presence 
of binding stop-loss constraints on trading positions.  
More generally, at any time horizon the loss functions of individual market participants 
and policy makers are likely to be different, making a uniform assessment of contagion 
difficult. From a market participant’s individual perspective, any trading day can be a 
‘crisis’ if an incorrect positioning/trading decision has been taken. In that sense, their 
individual loss function can be thought of as being symmetric.8 In contrast, in the case of 
the policy maker the loss function is likely to be asymmetric. Ceteris paribus, relatively 
                                                 
7 See also Morris and Shin (2002), Samet (1998) and Townsend (1983) on the difference between 
individual expectations and aggregate (market) expectations.  
8 In practice, the application of institution-specific thresholds is likely to introduce asymmetries. 
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more weight will be placed on avoiding a precipitous financial market downturn in order 
to avoid systemic risk.9  
The above observations suggest that, although policy makers generally wish to reduce the 
probability of extreme market movements, they are asymmetrically concerned with 
avoiding extreme negative outcomes. Examples of public policy actions to limit the risk 
of systemic failure are the adoption of electronic program-driven ‘stops’ in equity market 
trading, and the Federal Reserve’s decision to act as a co-ordinator of the private sector 
bailout of the Long Term Capital Management investment fund (LTCM) in September 
1998. The potential for crises may raise the ex ante real interest rate on financial assets 
and thus impose real economic costs; see Greenspan (1999).  
Early academic work on financial crises and contagion was motivated by the question of 
whether other countries were suffering unnecessarily for crimes they did not commit. 
This line of reasoning has been applied by Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) following 
the Mexican currency and debt crisis and the deep and protracted recession in Indonesia 
following the Asian crisis examined in Radelet and Sachs (1998). This was amply 
demonstrated during the Russian crisis of 1998: the Russian government bond default 
was the first ‘nuclear power’ default and the establishment of this precedent led to a 
massive reassessment of risk in global financial markets, and subsequently to the 
onslaught of the LTCM crisis.  
In addition to the international implications of crises, there is also potential contagion 
across different asset classes within a country. The effects can be substantial; for 
examples, see Dungey and Martin (2001) and Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2003).  At a 
theoretical level, balance sheet considerations such as extensive liability dollarization can 
generate ‘twin crises’ rippling from the currency to the banking and corporate sector 
(Chang and Velasco (2000a,b), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)). An important direction 
for future research thus involves combining cross-asset and cross-border transmissions.  
When crises are transmitted across asset markets and borders simultaneously, the 
                                                 
9 In closed-economy monetary policy models, such asymmetries may stem from central banks disliking 
recessions more than than booms. This provides a rationale for “opportunistic” loss functions suggested by 
Orphanides, Small, Wieland and Wilcox (1997); see also Tambakis (2002). 
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implications for both portfolio management and international financial regulation are 
enormous.  
The potentially asymmetric loss function of policy makers notwithstanding, crises and 
contagion may also yield positive outcomes. Contagion of other processes, such as 
structural policy reform, can be beneficial to the operation of an economy. Conversely, 
the threat of financial contagion can destabilise an already fragile macroeconomic 
environment, as was the case with reforms in Brazil following the turmoil associated with 
the 2001 presidential election; see Miller et al (2003). 
Assessing the effectiveness of policy interventions to reduce contagion is hampered by 
the lack of a counterfactual. For example, as noted earlier, turmoil in Brazil prompted the 
2001 presidential election candidates to sign a joint letter of agreement with the IMF on 
debt reform. The crisis may have resolved without the intervention of the IMF: although 
there was no crisis in this instance, perhaps there would not have been one anyway. In the 
financial turmoil in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand in 1997-98, it is not clear whether the 
involvement of international institutions improved the final outcomes. The heterogeneity 
in actual crises may render programs of reform that work in some cases detrimental in 
others, a charge often levied at IMF involvement in Indonesia. These observations 
suggest that policy makers need to retain a flexible and evolving approach to assistance in 
these situations.  
6. Financial Crisis Prevention and Management: The Role of the IMF 
The preceding discussion suggests that successful policies in one circumstance may 
prove disappointing in another. The recent literature on the International Monetary 
Fund’s role in preventing crises stresses the value of a joint commitment by the country 
and the Fund. This can be critical in catalyzing capital flows to enhance countries’ access 
to capital markets.  
In Tirole’s (2002) terminology, the IMF is a delegated monitor whose role is to mediate 
between the country and foreign investors. On the one hand, the presence of a bailout 
facility afforded by the program constitutes ex ante moral hazard; see Eichengreen and 
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Ruhl (2001). On the other hand, if they reduce ex post inefficiency, programs can 
improve incentives for preventative action and catalyze private sector lending. The 
impact IMF programs have on international bond spreads charged at issuance, alongside 
macroeconomic determinants of such spreads, has been studied by Eichengreen and 
Mody (2001) using transactional data. It appears that the IMF’s catalytic finance 
approach is effective provided the deterioration of foreign exchange reserves and debt 
levels is not irreversible.10  Moreover, large programs tend to be more successful when 
the money committed is not actually used. Inter alia, this suggests that precautionary 
deployment of Fund lines of credit is valuable. In other words, catalytic finance works 
when a financial crisis and insolvency are not imminent, so that private sector creditors 
are galvanized by official assistance. 
The distinction between crisis prevention and crisis management is inextricably linked to 
crisis and non-crisis period identification.  Whereas in the realm of crisis prevention it 
may be beneficial to improve the quality or quantity of publicly available information, the 
release of more information during a crisis may actually worsen it; see Danielsson and 
Zigrand (2003) and relatedly Morris and Shin (2002). Therefore, effective policy 
assessment requires correctly identifying exact changeover points, the same problem as 
establishing correct thresholds and sample periods discussed earlier. Classifying these 
points incorrectly can have undesirable results, including regulations paradoxically 
reinforcing crisis events. Regulatory environments need to take into account not just the 
means by which crises are prevented (for example, maintaining high capital adequacy 
ratios) but also the impact of those same regulatory structures during a crisis period.  
With hindsight, understanding the role of crisis policies informs the actions of future 
policy makers. For example, why did the precommitment of presidential candidates in the 
Brazilian elections in 2001 calm the situation, albeit with resolution uncertainty? Policy 
makers need to weigh the determinants of successful policies. Although there may be 
common themes across financial crises, there is also significant heterogeneity. As a 
                                                 
10 See also Corsetti, Guimaraes and Roubini (2003) and Morris and Shin (2003).      
 
 14
result, successful past policies will not always provide the appropriate answer, 
particularly in an environment of volatile short-term capital flows; see also Section 3. 
Policy guidelines require a forward-looking approach explicitly recognizing that crises 
are likely to occur and play out differently over time. This need may occasionally conflict 
with the IMF’s desire to have a “consistent implementation” of the framework for 
granting countries access to its resources (IMF 2003).  
7. Conclusion 
Containing the likelihood of contagious financial crises is a pressing policy issue at both 
national and international levels. As yet, there is no professional consensus on the 
appropriate definitions of what constitutes a financial crisis or contagion, despite 
substantial research progress towards these goals. We know that financial crises and 
contagion are intrinsically linked, and that contagious effects arise when crises are 
propagated across countries or markets after controlling for fundamental linkages and 
interdependencies. We also know that these transmissions may spread further through 
mechanisms such as cross-market hedging. 
However, we claim that broad agreement can be obtained on the following points: 
(i) Crises are in some way associated with an increase in the conditional volatility 
of financial market returns.  
(ii) The association of excess returns in one country or market with excess returns 
in another country after controlling for fundamentals (excess co-movement) is 
consistent with financial market contagion.  
New models will undoubtedly be required with the advent of new crises. However, 
some of the salient aspects outlined in this paper are likely to recur. These include: 
the fundamental linkages, the means of transmission across countries and asset 
classes, the statistical properties of the data, the simultaneous identification of 
contagion, interdependency and herding and the endogenous identification of crisis 
and non-crisis periods from sample data. Each of these issues is extremely important 
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for assessing the appropriate policy response to prevent crises and adequately 
managing those that occur. 
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